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Truth, Reconciliation, and the Cost  
of Adversarial Justice 
Trevor C.W. Farrow 
Afer all, I’m a storyteller. You can have it if you want ... Do with it what you 
will ... Just don’t say in the years to come that you would have lived your life 
diferently if only you had heard this story. You’ve heard it now. 
– Thomas King, “Afterwords: Private Stories” 
It is hard to re-build or restart relationships. It starts with seeing each other.  
It starts with acknowledging what needs to be repaired. 
– Shawn Atleo and Heather Atleo1 
That Indigenous people in Canada were victimized for well over a century 
by the residential schools system for Aboriginal children is not in question.2 
Te system, which amounted to an “assault on child and culture,” was designed
to “kill the Indian in the child.”3 Whether the legal system – purporting to
provide some form of compensation in the context of claims by survivors and
their families – has provided justice is a much more open question. Te costs
– fnancial, social, health, time, and so on – associated with pursuing the reso-
lution of residential schools claims through the justice system have been
enormous. Tese costs feed skepticism about the commitment of the justice
system to the process of truth and create immense barriers to progress towards 
reconciliation. 
Te point of this chapter, part of the body of Costs of Justice research,4 is
primarily to call out some of the problematic steps in the various residential 
schools claims processes that have resulted in and allowed for those costs,5 and
to situate those processes and costs in current ongoing truth and reconciliation 
eforts in Canada. In addition to the residential schools litigation, I will briefy 
mention several other problematic cases and contexts to make the point that, 
when thinking about access to justice, the residential schools litigation is not 
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an isolated incident but rather part of a continuum that many see as costly, 
unequal, and alienating justice in Canada.6 
Residential Schools 
Because the Truth and Reconciliation Commission so carefully and import-
antly documented the dark and tragic truth of the residential schools program 
in its 2015 report, I will not try to provide any kind of meaningful analysis of 
that shameful history here.7 Put very simply, for over a century, Aboriginal
families and communities were ripped apart as their children were taken from 
them and forced into residential schools. It is well documented that the experi-
ence of Aboriginal children was characterized by “violent” and “traumatic”
treatment.8 Taking children from their families and communities was part of
a purposeful strategy designed “to eliminate Aboriginal people as distinct
peoples and to assimilate them into the Canadian mainstream against their 
will.”9 Canada’s residential schools program amounted to a system of “cultural 
genocide.”10 It is a program that the federal government has since acknowledged
is “a sad chapter in our history,” “was wrong,” and “caused great harm.”11 
Dispute Resolution Process 
In response to the tragedies inficted by the residential schools program, thou-
sands of survivors brought claims against the government and church organ-
izations that were involved in running the program.12 As of 2006, approximately
15,000 claims were ongoing, involving an estimated 80,000 people.13 Many of 
the claims were being brought as individual civil litigation claims,14 a number 
were being advanced through class actions,15 and the balance were brought 
forward through the dispute resolution process initially set up by the federal 
government pursuant to the 2003 National Resolution Framework.16 Given
the challenges in bringing multiple claims individually, by class action, and
also through the dispute resolution framework,17 an efort was made to develop 
a process by which all outstanding claims could be resolved. An agreement in 
principle was reached in November 2005,18 and a national settlement was ap-
proved by nine courts across Canada in December 2006.19 Te settlement regime
included a common experience payment (CEP) (amounting to at least $1.9
billion), funds for an individual assessment process (IAP) (which could exceed 
the CEP), the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), re-
sources for commemorative events and healing processes (funds for these
three initiatives amounted to $205 million), funds and in-kind services from 
various church organizations for victims and family initiatives, and a legal fees 
agreement.20 
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Problems and Costs Associated with Adversarial Claim Resolution 
Notwithstanding the comprehensive procedural framework that was estab-
lished to resolve all outstanding claims as efciently and fairly as possible, many
claimants experienced heavy-handed, unfair, and costly treatment from all sides
in the context of trying to access the system and resolve their claims. If the 
government, religious organizations, and even legal regulators knew (or ac-
knowledged) then what they know now, much cost, pain, and revictimization 
experienced through the dispute resolution process and justice system could 
have been avoided or at least minimized. Because I have documented many ex-
amples of problematic behaviour elsewhere,21 I will only briefy discuss several 
examples in this chapter. 
Problematic Defendant-Side Conduct 
First, on the defendant side, it is clear that the government and church organ-
izations generally took culturally disconnected and adversarial – as opposed
to healing or reconciling – approaches in the context of the survivors and their
claims. Tere was a general refusal on the part of the government and the
church organizations to apologize or take responsibility for their involvement
in the residential schools program.22 Even though apologies came later,23 al-
though not by all,24 a failure to take responsibility early in the process has been
acknowledged as a mistake on the part of the institutional organizations.25 
Further, the initial federal government alternative dispute resolution process
was condemned as culturally disconnected, costly, slow, arbitrary, disrespect-
ful, and humiliating.26 At the same time, the more adversarial, tort-based
approach to resolving individual and class claims through the civil justice
system was disconnected from any notion of restoration, cultural sensitivity,
or reconciliation.27 
As for specifc problematic strategies and conduct, limitation periods were 
raised by the government and church organizations as shields against potential 
direct and vicarious tort liability claims in cases where causes of action ofen 
involved historic abuse and sexual abuse claims.28 In addition to limitation
defences, several diferent adversarial strategies for limiting liability and dam-
ages – for example, the “thin skull” or “crumbling skull” rules – were raised by 
the government and church defendants. Defendants would make the argument 
that – based on pre-existing conditions – they should not be responsible for 
making a plaintif better of than he or she originally was.29 Te irony is that 
various pre-existing conditions – anxiety, alcoholism, lack of higher education, 
and others – were caused at least in part by the very residential school programs
and experiences at issue in the litigation.30 
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In addition to “blame-the-victim” strategies, the government and church
organizations also used “blame-each-other” strategies in order to limit or deny 
responsibility for any residential school–related damage.31 Te institutional
defendants also actively sought to contest amounts, forms, and bases of liability 
and damage. Tis included defences against punitive damages,32 arguments
that abuse by a lay employee could not form the basis of vicarious liability
claims,33 and eforts to insulate church defendants from damage claims based 
on charitable status.34 
Finally, institutional defendants also raised a number of evidentiary and other
procedural challenges to limit or avoid liability. In terms of evidentiary chal-
lenges, for example, social science evidence regarding the efect of government 
approaches to educating Aboriginal children was called into question in the 
context of individual claims.35 Individual claimant credibility was also regularly
challenged by church and government defendants.36 Further, institutional de-
fendants sought to limit the defnitional scope of “residential schools” in order 
to limit potential coverage and liability.37 Te federal government also sought 
to strike out afdavits and resist document production.38 As for procedural 
challenges, for example, the adequacy of pleadings was questioned by requesting
particulars (which, while not in theory problematic on its face, in this context 
raises the potential of revictimization).39 In the context of class actions, certifca-
tion was vigorously resisted by church and government defendants.40 
Problematic Plaintif-Side Lawyer Conduct 
Problematic conduct was not limited to the defence of these cases. Te legal 
representation of survivor claimants also involved problematic and unprofes-
sional behaviour. For example, counsel for numbers of IAP claimants purported
to provide their clients with loans that were never received, ofen with unreason-
ably high interest rates.41 Other cases, as I have documented elsewhere,42 involved
insensitive and at times misleading client solicitations;43 exaggerated promises 
of success;44 improper disclosure to consulting non-lawyers of confdential
information;45 the unauthorized practice of law;46 failure to properly prepare 
and meet with clients;47 conficts of interest;48 unacceptable correspondence, 
arrangements, and termination letters;49 failure to press for full compensation 
amounts;50 disregard for important terms of the alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) settlement process;51 and misleading, incorrect, and falsely completed 
IAP forms.52 Overall, according to one judge, “claimants were ... treated not as 
individual people who had in many cases sufered traumatic personal experi-
ences ... but rather as claims, requiring little lawyer interaction,”53 or more
directly, “claims became abstracted from claimants.”54 
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Te costs associated with the litigation and dispute resolution processes, on all 
sides, have been massive. Court administration costs alone have amounted to 
“huge sums” of government money.55 On the defendant side, the government 
and church organizations have spent millions on legal and related expert, re-
search, and archival fees.56 For example, in 1999 alone, it was estimated that the 
total legal fees paid by church organizations in connection with residential
schools litigation totalled approximately $10 million.57 Te time and money
spent by government lawyers supported by their experts, researchers, and
consultants litigating these cases has also been massive, not to mention the 
agreement to pay a portion of the plaintif-side lawyer fees under the settlement
process. Much of this money could have been saved – and redirected towards 
more restorative initiatives – if the many aggressive and ultimately unsuccessful
adversarial government and church positions had not been advanced. 
Costs on the plaintif side were also ofen extremely high – sometimes out-
weighing any meaningful beneft from the litigation or settlements.58 In some 
cases, contingency fees were above the allowable rates provided for in the settle-
ment agreement;59 in others – particularly early in the process – half of recovered
amounts reportedly went to lawyers.60 It is important to acknowledge that not 
all cases and not all lawyers’ billing arrangements involved problematic fees.61 
However, the examples documented above and elsewhere62 are certainly not 
unique or isolated incidents. According to one report, the fees paid to some 
lawyers were seen as “unethical practices or greed” and “nothing short of gou-
ging,” and amounted to “revictimization” and “taking advantage of the wounded
and the weakest.”63 
In addition to fnancial costs, all of the adversarial strategies and conduct 
discussed above, including the use of appeals to resist or limit claims, resulted 
in other psychological and emotional costs. For example, the appeal by the 
Anglican Church in the F.S.M. case damaged the survivor claimant’s healing 
process. According to the survivor, “Te healing and closure that the trial judg-
ment provided ... was threatened by the Anglican appeal” and made the survivor
feel “abused all over again.”64 Similar revictimization concerns arose in the
context of other procedural challenges raised by institutional defendants,65 as
well as the unprofessional conduct of plaintif-side lawyers. According to one 
victim plaintif, her lawyer’s conduct resulted in the return of “traumatic feelings
she had experienced earlier in her life,” which also led to a feeling of “shame.”66 
Overall, as summarized in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report 
(the TRC Report), the residential schools litigation was “especially difcult for 
the Survivors, many of whom were revictimized through explicit questioning 
and adversarial treatment by the Government of Canada, the churches, and 
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even their own lawyers.”67 Taken together, the “arduous” process of adversarial 
litigation had signifcant negative impacts on litigant survivors.68 
None of these costs, of course, take into account the failure of the Canadian 
legal system to address non-abuse claims, including individual and collective 
loss of language, family relationships, and culture, among others, not just for 
survivors but for their parents, children, and communities.69 Tese costs also 
do not take into account the further damage caused by the residential schools 
litigation and settlement process to the already broken institutional and social 
relationships between Indigenous people and the federal government, religious
organizations, and, generally, the rest of Canada. 
In the end, signifcant sums of money have been paid out in connection with 
residential schools claims. Te TRC successfully completed its mandate, some 
apologies have been made, and important truth and reconciliation work has 
begun. However, the costs associated with the damage claims and overall settle-
ment arrangements – through early litigation and class actions, through the 
initial ADR process, and even under the fnal settlement agreement – have been
extremely high, and in some cases so high as to amount to the victimization of 
surviving claimants all over again.70 
Ongoing Challenges 
In addition to the problematic legacy of the various residential schools dispute 
resolution processes, there have been and continue to be other problematic cases
and events involving Canada’s Indigenous communities and its justice system. 
Although not the primary focus of this chapter, they – like the residential schools
dispute resolution legacy – form part of the overall and ongoing problematic 
and costly treatment that Indigenous people and their communities ofen face 
through Canada’s justice system when pursuing claims for violations of basic 
human rights. 
For example, the “Sixties Scoop” – the systematic government-initiated re-
moval of thousands of Indigenous children from their families and their place-
ment in non-Indigenous families (in the period between approximately 1965 
and 1984)71 – continues to resonate negatively in Indigenous families, com-
munities, and the overall Canadian public, and in the child protection system 
in particular.72 As recognized by the Divisional Court in Brown v Attorney
General of Canada, the fallout from this government program involved claims 
that “these children were deprived of their culture, customs, traditions, language
and spirituality,” which “led them to experience loss of self-esteem, identity 
crisis and trauma in trying to re-claim their lost culture and traditions.”73 
Although another example of costly and failed attempts procedurally to dispose
of Indigenous claims prior to trial in an adversarial fashion,74 these harms and 
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these claims – and in particular the government’s responsibility for these
harms – have been recognized by the courts.75 Te settlements of the claims – 
specifcally including the legal fees – have not been favoured by all. For ex-
ample, according to one class member, who described some of the lawyers
involved as “cultural vultures,” the settlement in his case “exploits Indigenous
Peoples and enriches the lawyers.”76 Further, the overall initiative has now been
acknowledged by the federal government as a “dark and painful chapter in
Canada’s history.”77 
In many cases related to or because of the residential schools and the Six-
ties Scoop, there continues to be an overwhelming number of Indigenous
children and young people in child welfare and protection programs across 
Canada. According to a 2011 Statistics Canada survey, 3.6 percent of all First 
Nations children under ffeen years old were in foster care (compared with
0.3 percent of non-Aboriginal children), and almost half of all children under 
ffeen years old in foster care were Aboriginal children.78 In 2017, Jane Philpott, 
the federal government’s former Minister of Indigenous Services, described the
ongoing and vastly disproportionate number of Indigenous children in the
system as a “humanitarian crisis.”79 While signifcant challenges exist for
Indigenous parents80 – many of which developed as a result of experiences they 
sufered as part of the residential schools and the Sixties Scoop81 – there is no 
doubt that the vast overrepresentation of Indigenous children in the child wel-
fare system stems in large part from systemic unfairness, bias, ignorance, inad-
equate education, poverty, discrimination, and racism.82 Te resulting costs, in 
terms of broken individuals, families, and lost relationships, are tragic and
signifcant.83 
Unfortunately, although this chapter largely focuses on civil justice, we know 
that very similar problems exist in the criminal justice system. First, it is well 
known that Aboriginal men, women, and young people are vastly overrepre-
sented in Canada’s prisons and youth custody facilities.84 For example, in
2015–16, according to Statistics Canada, 26 percent of adults admitted to prov-
incial and territorial correctional services were Aboriginal, although Aboriginal
people represented only 3 percent of the Canadian adult population.85 Te
same is true for young people. According to Shawn Atleo, former National
Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Aboriginal children “are more likely to
end up in jail than to graduate from high school.”86 For example, in 2015–16,
Aboriginal youth represented 35 percent of admissions to correctional ser-
vices, while Aboriginal youth between the ages of twelve and seventeen made
up approximately 7 percent of the youth population in reporting jurisdictions.87 
Further, 43 percent of all female youth admitted into correctional services were
Aboriginal.88 
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Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci, also noting the
overrepresentation of First Nations people in prison populations, reported that
“the justice system generally as applied to First Nations peoples ... is quite
frankly in a crisis.”89 In addition to problematic issues of overincarceration,
Iacobucci reported a serious lack of representation by Aboriginal people in all
aspects of the justice system: “Overrepresented in the prison population, First 
Nations peoples are signifcantly underrepresented, not just on juries, but among
all those who work in the administration of justice in this province, whether as 
court ofcials, prosecutors, defence counsel, or judges.”90 Tis lack of represen-
tation has added to an overall sense of exclusion and distrust by First Nations 
people when it comes to all aspects of the justice system.91 
High-profle acquittals in murder cases involving the deaths of Indigenous 
young people92 have only served to further alienate members of Indigenous 
communities.93 Particularly where juries have been selected to include only white
jurors (purposely excluding potential Indigenous jurors),94 signifcant concerns
about the fairness of justice have been raised by a range of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities and voices in this country,95 including by the Prime 
Minister and former Justice Minister.96 All of these points of alienation and
distrust, coupled with the challenges faced by and fndings of the National
Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,97 lead to a 
serious and very troubling erosion in the trust and confdence that all people 
– particularly members of Indigenous communities – have in Canada’s justice 
system. According to the mother of Colton Boushie, a young Aboriginal murder
victim, “Tis racism is dividing us ... I already knew it was a kangaroo court.”98 
As former Chief Justice of Canada Beverley McLachlin stated, “If people are 
excluded from the system, if they conclude it exists only to serve the interests 
of the elites, they will turn away. Respect for the rule of law will diminish, and 
our society will be the poorer.”99 Te costs of distrust and alienation should not 
be underestimated. 
Signs of Change? 
Te TRC Report included a number of important justice-related Calls to
Action.100 While several specifcally addressed governments, some focused on 
other actors in the justice sector, including lawyers and law schools.101 Although 
much work remains to be done in the justice system to acknowledge and under-
stand the tragedy of the residential schools and their legacy, and to start the 
transformational healing work of reconciliation (contemplated by the Calls to 
Action), signs of positive change are emerging across the justice sector. 
For example, starting with the federal government, a new “Rights Framework”
was announced by the Prime Minister in February 2018.102 According to the 
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government, it “will include new legislation and policy that will make the rec-
ognition and implementation of rights the basis for all relations between
Indigenous Peoples and the federal government going forward.”103 It will also 
support the “rebuilding” of Indigenous governments and nations and advance 
self-determination.104 According to the Prime Minister, recognizing and imple-
menting Indigenous rights “will chart a new way forward ... and undo decades 
of mistrust, poverty, broken promises, and injustices.”105 Te federal government
has also promised to “fully implement” all Calls to Action in the TRC Report106 
and to reduce the incarceration rate of Indigenous people, who are overrepre-
sented in Canada’s prisons.107 Some of these commitments can be seen, for
example, in budgetary allocations contained in the 2018 Federal Budget.108 
Others can be seen, for example, in new legislative proposals introduced to 
eliminate the use of discriminatory peremptory jury challenges.109 Provincial 
ministries are also actively looking at ways to respond to the TRC Report and
reframe how governments acknowledge destructive past practices, as well as
at how governments can move forward to promote and champion a culture of 
reconciliation and reform.110 
As for law societies and bar associations, the Law Society of Ontario (LSO), 
for example, approved its Indigenous Framework,111 which is designed to guide 
the LSO’s work to realize Call to Action 27, particularly in an efort to promote 
access to justice and equity.112 Other organizations have also responded posi-
tively to the Calls to Action.113 
Law schools have also been actively taking up the invitation in Call to Action 
28 to refect on and reform their curricular approaches, oferings, and programs
as they relate to Aboriginal law and Indigenous people.114 For example, the 
University of Victoria created a joint Canadian common law and Indigenous 
Legal Orders JD/JID degree.115 Other law schools are also looking at signifcant 
ways of embracing indigenization of their programs, both in and out of the 
formal classroom.116 For example, in addition to its Anishinaabe Law Camp,117 
Osgoode Hall Law School recently added an Indigenous and Aboriginal Law 
Requirement to its JD program.118 
Courts and judges are also looking at ways of positively addressing the TRC’s
Calls to Action and related issues involving Aboriginal law and Indigenous
legal traditions. According to Chief Justice of Canada Richard Wagner, “We 
have begun the process of reconciliation with our indigenous co-citizens, with 
the goal of building a new relationship. Te process is difcult, as it has to be; 
the scars run deep. We cannot change the past, but we can recommit ourselves 
each day to right the wrongs that we can. It will take time. But we will do the 
work. We are committed.”119 As for specifc initiatives, the National Judicial 
Institute continues to provide judicial training on issues related to Aboriginal 
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law and cultural context.120 Te Federal Court–Aboriginal Law Bar Liaison
Committee developed specifc practice guidelines for litigation involving
Aboriginal Peoples.121 Te Federal Court has also started to issue some rulings 
in Cree and Dene.122 
Judges themselves are also taking up the issues in individual cases. For ex-
ample, in a case involving a young Aboriginal woman without a criminal record
who pleaded guilty to drug smuggling charges, Justice Hill of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice was asked to consider the constitutionality of a min-
imum two-year sentence for such drug-related ofences. When describing the 
accused, he commented that she “is very much the face of many Aboriginal 
ofenders whose background has played a real role ... in their presence before 
the criminal courts in this country.”123 In fnding the minimum sentence to be 
a “grossly disproportionate punishment”124 and in ordering a sentence of less 
than two years, Justice Hill specifcally highlighted that the “Supreme Court of 
Canada, the TRC, and numerous other resources have recognized, in respect 
of Canada’s Indigenous peoples, the state’s contribution to cultural genocide, 
the intergenerational efects of colonialism, discrimination, unfulflled prom-
ises, and a ‘tragic history’ of the treatment of Aboriginal peoples within the
Canadian criminal justice system.”125 Further, he acknowledged that the “courts
are not isolated from the ongoing process of reconciliation and meaningful 
nation-to-nation dialogue involving Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.”126 
Conclusion 
Whether or not Canadians previously knew about the depth and breadth of the 
residential schools tragedy, we certainly know about it now – thanks in particular
to the transformative work of the TRC. Te same can be said about the justice 
system’s challenged, ofen problematic, and typically very costly (fnancial and 
otherwise) handling of the residential schools claims: we have “heard [about] 
it now.”127 Documenting some of the problems and related costs of the residential
schools claims in this chapter is part of the process of “acknowledging what 
needs to be repaired” in an efort to start “seeing each other.”128 
Te justice-related Calls to Action in the TRC Report are clear. Much needs 
to be done in all parts of the justice system, there appears to be signifcant good 
will, and at this stage, positive signs of change are emerging. As the Chief Jus-
tice of Canada stated, the process will be difcult,129 but reforming the justice 
system in line with the TRC’s Calls to Action must be done. As the TRC itself 
made clear, the “continued failure of the justice system denies Aboriginal people
the safety and opportunities that most Canadians take for granted.”130 Te
cost of doing nothing is far too high. As former Supreme Court Justice Frank 
Iacobucci commented in the context of his recommendations for jury reform, 
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“I realize that many of my recommendations will involve costs, but ... when 
principles of justice and fairness for thousands of people are involved, the f-
nancial aspects of the matter should not trump those fundamental principles 
... Moreover, the costs of doing nothing will likely be more than the costs of 
implementing these recommendations.”131 As recent return on investment and 
social return on investment research confrms,132 not only is investing in justice 
the right thing to do, it also makes signifcant economic and social sense as well 
– for Indigenous communities, for the justice system, and for all Canadians. 
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